Bowen: Authoritarian Regimes Die Gradually, Then Suddenly — But Iran Is Not There Yet
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Jeremy Bowen
International Editor
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Mortuary videos show violent government crackdown in Iran
Understanding the Gradual Decline of Authoritarian Regimes
How does an authoritarian regime meet its end? Ernest Hemingway famously described going broke as a process that occurs “gradually, then suddenly.” Protesters in Iran and their supporters abroad have been yearning for the moment when the Islamic regime in Tehran reaches that “suddenly” stage. However, current signs indicate that if it is indeed dying, it remains firmly in the gradual phase.
The recent two weeks of unrest have culminated in a significant crisis for the regime. Iranian frustration has boiled over on multiple occasions, but this latest upheaval is compounded by severe military pressures that Iran has faced over the past two years, primarily from the U.S. and Israel. More pressing for ordinary Iranians struggling to feed their families has been the crippling impact of sanctions.
– In September, the UK, Germany, and France reimposed all UN sanctions that had initially been lifted under the now-defunct 2015 nuclear deal.
– By 2025, food price inflation surged past 70%.
– The Iranian currency, the rial, reached an all-time low in December.
Is the Iranian Regime on the Brink?
Despite immense pressure, evidence suggests that the Iranian regime is not on the verge of collapse. A key factor contributing to its resilience is the unwavering loyalty of its security forces. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Iranian authorities have invested heavily in a sophisticated and brutal network for coercion and repression.
– During recent protests, security forces have followed orders to shoot at fellow citizens, effectively quelling dissent. Currently, demonstrations have subsided largely due to the regime’s imposition of a communication blackout.
– At the heart of this repression lies the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), a critical institution that defends the ideology and governance of the Islamic Revolution, reporting directly to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
– The IRGC is estimated to have around 150,000 armed personnel, functioning as a parallel military force, also playing a significant role in Iran’s economy.
Additionally, the IRGC is supported by a volunteer paramilitary organization known as the Basij militia, which claims to have millions of members, with active estimates in the hundreds of thousands. The Basij has been instrumental in the regime’s confrontations with protesters.
Historical Context: The Mechanisms of Control
I witnessed the IRGC and Basij in action during the 2009 protests in Tehran, where they suppressed widespread demonstrations following a disputed election. Armed with rubber truncheons and wooden clubs, Basij volunteers lined the streets, backed by uniformed officers wielding automatic weapons. In under two weeks, once-boisterous protests dwindled to small groups of students chanting slogans. Eventually, even these were silenced as hope of widespread dissent faded.
The apparent strength of internal security forces implies that the supreme leader and his aides cannot afford to let their guard down. U.S. President Donald Trump continues to communicate threats regarding potential actions, contributing to a growing resentment among millions of Iranians who seek the regime’s fall. In Tehran, the government appears torn between bellicose rhetoric and a willingness to engage in negotiations with the U.S.
Navigating these discussions will be complex, particularly in light of the longstanding issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear agenda and ballistic missile programs. Yet such negotiations could serve to buy time for the Iranian regime, especially if Trump believes a deal, however improbable, is on the horizon.
The Future: What Lies Ahead for Iran?
Trump’s pressure campaign includes threats to impose a 25% tariff on goods from nations engaging with Iran. However, it’s unclear how effective this strategy will be, particularly when China remains a principal buyer of Iranian oil. With tensions easing between Trump and China, it seems unlikely he would jeopardize that relationship solely to maintain pressure on Iran.
For the aging Supreme Leader, preserving the Islamic Republic’s power structure is paramount. Accordingly, the regime will respond harshly to any resurgence of protest. Complicating matters is the lack of cohesive leadership among dissidents; the eldest son of the Shah, removed by the revolution nearly half a century ago, has attempted to step in as a figurehead but is hindered by his family’s legacy and ties to Israel.
Lessons from other authoritarian collapses loom large. Take, for example, former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who was confronted with a well-organized rebel offensive despite previously appearing to gain traction and support. The rapid decision by key military forces to abandon him resulted in his swift exit.
Iranian authorities also recall the fate of Tunisia’s President Ben Ali in 2011, whose fall triggered a chain reaction across the region. Had the armed forces in Tunisia opted to protect protesters instead of enforcing control, the outcome might have shifted dramatically.
Could a similar scenario happen in Iran? Perhaps. But not yet. Opponents of the Islamic regime remain hopeful for increased pressure both domestically and internationally, along with the emergence of effective leadership to expedite their slow decay, transforming it from gradual to sudden.