Indus Water Treaty Suspension Impact On Pakistan : Strategic Analysis

The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) by India, announced on April 23, 2025, following the Pahalgam terror attack, has raised concerns about its potential economic impact on Pakistan and India’s capacity to halt water flows. Below is a detailed analysis addressing the expected economic loss for Pakistan, India’s readiness to stop water flows, and the time required to do so, based on available information.

Expected Economic Loss for Pakistan

Pakistan’s economy is heavily dependent on the Indus River system, particularly the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab), which supply approximately 80% of its water (135 million acre-feet or 99 billion cubic meters annually). The suspension of the IWT could disrupt water availability, with significant economic consequences:

• Agricultural Impact:
  • About 80% of Pakistan’s cultivated land (16 million hectares) relies on the Indus system, contributing 21–24% to GDP and employing 37–45% of the workforce. Reduced water flows could lower yields of key crops like wheat, rice, sugarcane, and cotton, leading to food shortages and price spikes.
  • Estimates suggest crop production could drop significantly, with one X post claiming a potential 30% reduction in yields, though this lacks precise attribution.
  • A defense expert cited a potential GDP drop of 20–25% due to agricultural disruptions, though this figure appears speculative and lacks detailed methodology.
• Hydropower and Energy:
  • The Indus system supports ~30% of Pakistan’s electricity through dams like Tarbela and Mangla. Reduced flows could strain power generation, impacting industries and households, and exacerbating energy shortages.
  • Power cuts could lead to industrial slowdowns, increasing unemployment and economic instability.
• Groundwater and Soil Degradation:
  • Reduced surface water may force reliance on groundwater, worsening aquifer depletion and land salinization, which already affects 43% of Pakistan’s arable land. This could lead to long-term desertification and further agricultural losses.
  • Pakistan’s limited water storage capacity (14.4 million acre-feet, ~10% of its annual share) exacerbates vulnerability to flow disruptions.
• Broader Economic Fallout:
  • Rural economic instability could trigger loan defaults, unemployment, and urban migration, straining cities like Lahore and Karachi.
  • Food price spikes and reduced agricultural exports (e.g., cotton, rice) could worsen Pakistan’s trade balance and economic stress, given its already water-stressed status.
  • Quantifying exact losses is challenging due to variables like the extent of water reduction and Pakistan’s mitigation measures. However, disruptions during peak agricultural seasons (e.g., sowing periods) could amplify short-term losses, with long-term impacts depending on infrastructure changes.

India’s Readiness to Stop Water Flows

India’s ability to stop or significantly reduce water flows to Pakistan is constrained by its current infrastructure and the natural flow of the western rivers. The IWT suspension removes treaty obligations, allowing India to pursue new projects without notifying Pakistan, but immediate large-scale diversion is limited:

• Current Infrastructure:
  • Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab): India’s infrastructure primarily consists of run-of-the-river hydroelectric projects (e.g., Kishanganga, 330 MW; Ratle, 850 MW under construction), which do not require large storage reservoirs and cannot significantly alter flows. The Kishanganga project, for instance, stores only 18.35 million cubic meters (MCM), a fraction of the 99 billion cubic meters allocated to Pakistan. )data – India has not fully utilized its 20% share of the western rivers due to inadequate storage and diversion infrastructure, with only 6.42 lakh acres irrigated in Jammu and Kashmir out of a permitted 13.4 lakh acres.
  • Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej): India already utilizes most of its allocated 33 million acre-feet (41 billion cubic meters) for agriculture in Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan, and hydropower. Projects like the Shahpurkandi Dam (completed 2024) and the planned Ujh Dam (925 MCM storage) have reduced surplus flows to Pakistan (estimated at 9.3 billion cubic meters annually). On March 1, 2025, India stopped Ravi River flows to Pakistan, marking a significant shift.
• Planned Projects:
  • India has a three-step plan (short-, mid-, and long-term) to enhance dam capacity along the Indus basin to store more water and prevent flows to Pakistan. Key projects include:
    • Pakal Dul (1,000 MW), Kiru (624 MW), Sawalkot (1,856 MW), and Ratle (850 MW) on the Chenab and its tributaries.
    • Kishanganga II (40 MW), initiated in January 2025.
  • These projects focus on hydroelectricity and limited storage, but large-scale reservoirs to block significant flows are not yet in place. Construction is hindered by difficult terrain and local protests.
  • The Ujh Multipurpose Project on a Ravi tributary, if completed, could add 925 MCM storage, but it is still in development.
• Data Sharing and Operational Changes:
  • India can immediately stop sharing hydrological data, crucial for Pakistan’s flood forecasting and irrigation planning, potentially causing mismanagement during monsoons (June–September). Experts note India was already sharing only ~40% of required data before the suspension.
  • India can modify operations, such as reservoir flushing (e.g., Kishanganga), to disrupt downstream flows during critical seasons, though this has limited impact without large storage.
• Limitations:
  • Experts like Himanshu Thakkar emphasize that India lacks the “massive storage infrastructure and extensive canals” to hold back tens of billions of cubic meters during high-flow periods. Current projects can at best reduce flows by 5–10%.
  • The treaty allows India to store 3.6 million acre-feet on western rivers, but no significant storage capacity exists in Jammu and Kashmir.
  • Natural river flows will continue by gravity unless India builds large-scale dams or diversion canals, which are not currently feasible.

Time Required to Stop Water Flows

The timeline for India to significantly stop or divert water flows to Pakistan depends on infrastructure development, which is a multi-year process:

• Short-Term (0–2 Years):
  • Immediate actions include halting data sharing and adjusting operations (e.g., reservoir flushing) to cause minor disruptions, potentially affecting Pakistan’s sowing seasons. These could reduce flows by 5–10% but won’t stop them entirely.
  • Existing projects like Kishanganga can be optimized, but their storage capacity is minimal (e.g., 18.35 MCM).
  • No significant flow stoppage is possible due to infrastructure limitations.
• Mid-Term (3–7 Years):
  • Completion of under-construction projects like Ratle, Pakal Dul, Kiru, and Sawalkot could increase India’s control over western river flows, but these are primarily hydroelectric, not storage-focused. Experts estimate 5–7 years for completion due to complex terrain and funding needs.
  • The Ujh Project could enhance storage on eastern rivers, further reducing surplus flows, but completion timelines are unclear.
  • Even with these, large-scale diversion or stoppage remains challenging without major reservoirs.
• Long-Term (10+ Years):
  • Building large storage dams or extensive canal systems to divert western river flows would take over a decade due to engineering challenges, environmental clearances, and potential local opposition.
  • Such infrastructure could theoretically allow India to “turn off Pakistan’s tap,” but this would require unprecedented investment and political will.
  • An X post suggests a minimum of 5–10 years for constructing water-diverting apparatus like check dams, aligning with expert estimates.

Critical Analysis

• Economic Loss Speculation: Claims of a 20–25% GDP drop or 30% yield reduction are plausible in a worst-case scenario but lack rigorous backing and assume significant flow reductions that India cannot currently achieve. Pakistan’s adaptation (e.g., water-efficient crops, groundwater use) could mitigate some impacts, though at high cost.
• India’s Intent: The suspension appears more as a political and diplomatic pressure tactic than an immediate plan to stop water flows, given infrastructure constraints. India’s focus on new projects and data withholding suggests a long-term strategy to maximize its water use rather than an abrupt cutoff.
• Pakistan’s Response: Pakistan has called the suspension an “act of war” and may seek World Bank mediation or legal recourse, though the IWT’s dispute resolution mechanism is limited if India fully abrogates the treaty. Escalation risks, including diplomatic or military tensions, could complicate India’s plans.
• Legal Considerations: The IWT lacks a unilateral exit clause, but India could leverage Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) to argue for abrogation due to “fundamental change of circumstances” (e.g., terrorism). However, India’s non-signatory status to the convention and international scrutiny may limit this approach’s legitimacy.

Conclusion

Pakistan faces potential economic losses from reduced crop yields, energy shortages, and rural instability, with speculative estimates suggesting a 20–25% GDP drop in a severe scenario. However, India’s current infrastructure limits flow reductions to 5–10%, with no immediate capacity to stop water entirely. Short-term disruptions (0–2 years) will be minimal, relying on data withholding and minor operational changes. Mid-term projects (3–7 years) could enhance control, but large-scale stoppage requires 10+ years of infrastructure development. India’s suspension is a strategic move to pressure Pakistan, but its full impact depends on future investments and geopolitical dynamics.